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Abstract
The introduction of new digital production and distribution technologies
may alter the firms’ strategy sets, as they are not able to commit credibly
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by Richard Cornes and Roger Hartley (2001), I calculate the Nash equilibrium
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1 Introduction
In recent years, a lot of research has been done to study the effects of emerging
electronic coordination in the field of production and distribution on the structure
and performance of oligopoly markets. Bakos (1997) discussed the consequences
of reduced search costs in electronic markets. Other related papers investigate the
impact of declining transport costs due to new technologies (see Morasch/Welzel,
2000), or the impact of changing cost structures as well as the increased potential
for product differentiation (see Belleflamme, 2001). The present paper is dedicated
to an aspect that has widely been neglected: The use of electronic coordination
in production technology may change players’ strategy sets and thus influence the
market result.
Consider the different causes for price and quantity competition that have widely
been discussed. In their seminal work, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) describe the
influence of time structure on a firm’s strategy set in an oligopoly market: A player
can commit himself to a quantity strategy if he has to decide about his output before
sale or if the firm has to make sunk capacity investments before production. Under
these circumstances, the Cournot game can be interpreted as the reduced form of a
two-stage game where firms decide about capacity in the first stage and set prices in
the second. Gu¨th (1995) extends this analysis by considering a heterogenous goods
market.
In a more general approach, Klemperer and Meyer (1989) assume that a company
can commit to a specific supply function whose slope follows from the production
technology the firm uses. As Vives (1999) elucidates, price and quantity setting be-
haviour can be interpreted as the extreme cases of a totally elastic or inelastic supply
function and arise from different slopes of marginal costs. While flat marginal costs
lead to Bertrand-like strategies, quantity strategies correspond to steep marginal
costs, linked to inflexible technologies.
Obviously, the latter case corresponds to old industry—e. g. steel-works—where
firms have to build huge plants before they start production. Still, similar constraints
also appear for modern industries and services. Records and CDs are pressed before
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sale, thus producers have to decide on their circulation, first. Likewise, the network
of local agencies can be interpreted as a capacity constraint for insurance companies.
Banks face similar constraints, with regard to their branch offices. Besides, they are
bound to legal capital restrictions.
Yet, new electronic technologies have a strong impact on both production and distri-
bution of goods and services. Electronic commerce enables banks and insurance com-
panies to sell their services without making use of traditional distribution channels.
Internet banks buy services like emergency call centers on the market themselves,
whenever needed. Thus they can react flexibly on changing demand—outsourcing
enables them even to escape regulatory capital constraints (see Teske, 2002). More-
over, by using digital production it is no longer necessary to disseminate information
through physical media. As a consequence, the provider of information goods—that
is, publishers or music companies—may sell and distribute the plain information as
a download on-line.
Hence, the use of electronic coordination—especially to produce digital goods and
services—alters the production and distribution process in two important ways:
• Electronic coordination eliminates time lags between production and sale, as
flexible technologies allow firms to generate goods or services on demand.
• Capacity constraints vanish since new technologies enable (almost) unre-
stricted replication of information goods with marginal costs close to or at
zero level.
Following the reasoning above, suppliers that have already adopted such a new
technology operate as price competitors, because they are no longer in a position to
commit themselves credibly to a quantity. Other firms that still use old production
and distribution technology have to build up capacities before production. Thus,
they are assumed to set quantities.
Now consider a market where some firms have switched to new technologies, whereas
others still use old technology, that is, a market with both price and quantity setters.
Singh and Vives (1984) analyse a market like this in a duopoly framework, with one
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price and quantity setter each. Sziderovsky and Molnar (1992) provide a more
general analysis of a so-called mixed oligopoly and prove existence and uniqueness
of the Nash equilibrium. However, their framework is not suitable to study the
consequences of a technology switch-over, since they do not provide explicite results.
The model I use is based on a framework with symmetrically differentiated products.
In its linear specification, it can be solved for the equilibrium by making use of recent
progress in the theory of aggregative games. This approach, introduced originally by
Reinhard Selten (1971) and developed further by Cornes and Hartley (2001), exploits
the special structure of games where the players’ payoff functions only depend on
two scalars—their own strategy and the unweighted sum of the choices made by
all players in the game, that is, the total aggressiveness of the game. Cornes and
Hartley (2001) also state that some games may be “k-reducable”, that is, players
decide not on one, but on k aggregable strategy variables. In fact, I apply that
extension here.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the basic model. Pre-
suming profit maximation, replacement functions and collective response curves of
price or quantity setting firms will be derived to determine the Nash equilibrium of
the game. Section three continues with a comparative static analysis of the equilib-
rium. With regard to its effect on the firm’s strategy set, I discuss the implications
of a technology switch on a company’s own output, on its competitors and on mar-
ket efficiency. Implications for investment incentives are briefly discussed in the
conclusions.
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2 The Basic Model
2.1 Model Assumptions and Strategic Demand
The basic model applies a concept of symmetric product differentiation originally
developed by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). N firms1 (indexed by
i = 1, . . . , N) use a linear-homogenous technology creating individual and constant
marginal costs ci to produce a specific variety of a symmetrically differentiated
product xi sold at price pi. The demand functions for the firms’ products are
generated by a representative consumer with a linear-quadratic utility
u(x1, . . . , xN) =
N∑
i=1
xi − 1
2
(
N∑
i=1
x2i + b
N∑
i=1
∑
i6=j
xixj
)
−
N∑
i=1
pixi (1)
yielding inverse demand functions
pi = 1− xi − b
∑
j 6=i
xj. (2)
The parameter b measures the degree of substitutability between any two products.
If b = 1, products are perfect substitutes, whereas all firms produce independent
goods if b = 0.
Suppose that in a simultanous move n companies (i = 1, . . . , n) play Cournot strate-
gies (that is, set quantities), whileN−n firms (i = n+1, . . . , N) play price strategies.
Seperating exogenous (strategically chosen) and endogenous prices and quantities
results in the following inverse demand for a quantity adjusting firm j and a price
setting firm k, respectively:
pj = 1− b
n∑
i=1,i6=j
xi − b
N∑
i=n+1
xi − xj
= 1− b
n∑
i=1
xi − b
N∑
i=n+1
xi − (1− b)xj (3)
1I assume that all firms earn positive profits and actually participate in the market. However,
an endogenous market entry decision that may be added in a two stage model would not change
any basic results.
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pk = 1− b
n∑
i=1
xi − b
N∑
i=n+1,i6=k
xi − xk
= 1− b
n∑
i=1
xi − b
N∑
i=n+1
xi − (1− b)xk (4)
Equation (4) can be transformed into a direct demand function:
xk =
1− b∑ni=1 xi − b∑Ni=n+1 xi − pk
1− b (5)
Summing up the (N − n) demand functions of the firms using price strategies and
rearranging terms, gives the total quantity produced by the Bertrand players:
N∑
i=n+1
xi =
(N − n)(1− b∑ni=1 xi)−∑Ni=n+1 pi
1 + b(N − n− 1) (6)
After inserting this expression into (3) and (5) and denoting the aggregate of strate-
gic price and quantity choices
∑N
i=n+1 pi and
∑n
i=1 xi by P and X, respectively, the
(inverse) demand functions can be written in their strategic form
pj =
1− b
1 + b(N − n− 1) − (1− b)xj −
b(1− b)X
1 + b(N − n− 1)
+
bP
1 + b(N − n− 1) (7)
xk =
1
1 + b(N − n− 1) −
pk
1− b −
bX
1 + b(N − n− 1)
+
bP
(1 + b(N − n− 1))(1− b) (8)
Equations (3) and (5) are now available in a form, such that the strategically chosen
(exogenous) sizes appear on the right hand side, whereas endogenous variables can
be found on the left hand side. Now the aggregative character of the game becomes
obvious: Both endogenous output of the Bertrand players and the prices of the
Cournot firms—and thus profits—only depend on their own strategy (that is, their
aggressiveness) and the total sum of strategically chosen prices and quantities. Ac-
cording to Cornes and Hartley (2001), a game of this structure is “two-reducable”,
that is, it can be reduced into a system of two equations and then be solved for the
Nash equilibrium.
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2.2 Collective Response and the Mixed-Oligopoly Nash
Equilibrium
Consider now the Cournot and Bertrand players maximizing their profits:
max
xj
pij(xj,P,X) = pj(xj,P,X) · xj − cj · xj (9)
max
pk
pik(pk,P,X) = pk · xk(pk,P,X)− ck · xk(pk,P,X) (10)
Firm j seeks to maximize its profit by choosing quantity xj, taking as given the
aggregate quantity produced by its competitors, X − xj, as well as the sum of
all strategic prices P. In contrast, a firm k considers the effect of its own price
decision on aggregate P, given a fixed X and fixed aggregate prices of its Bertrand
competitors, P− pk. Solving for the first order conditions, one receives firm j’s and
firm k’s so-called replacement function ηi(X,P):
2
xj = ηj(X,P) =
1− b− b(1− b)X+ bP− (1− b+ b(N − n))cj
(1− b)(2− b+ 2b(N − n)) (11)
pk = ηk(X,P) =
1− b− b(1− b)X+ bP+ (1− 2b+ b(N − n))ck
2− 3b+ 2b(N − n) (12)
Unlike a reaction function, ηi does not describe a player i’s optimal response to his
competitors’ strategy choice (that is, X − xj or P − pk, respectively), but to the
total aggregate X or P, which includes his own strategy choice.3 Using the fact that
in equilibrium the aggregate reaction complies with the aggregate strategy choice—
so
∑n
i=1 ηj(X,P) = X and
∑N
i=n+1 ηk(X,P) = P—we can solve for the strategic
quantity produced and the strategic price aggregate, that is,
X =
(1− b)n+ bnP− (1− b+ b(N − n))∑ni=1 ci
(1− b)(2− b+ b(2N − n)) (13)
P =
(1− b)(N − n)− b(1− b)(N − n)X
2− 3b+ b(N − n)
+
(1− 2b+ b(N − n))∑Ni=n+1 ci
2− 3b+ b(N − n) . (14)
2Cornes and Hartley (2001) use this expression. The greek letter η traces back to Seltens (1971)
terminology Einpassungsfunktion.
3So, ηj(X) = Rj(X−j) and ηk(P) = Rk(P−k).
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Figure 1: Collective response curves in a mixed oligopoly
Notice that the aggregate quantity decision X depends on the aggregate prices
P and vice versa. Hence, the equations above may be interpreted as collective
reaction functions. The graphic presentation of the mixed oligopoly (see Figure
1) displays these collective response curves of price and quantity adjusting firms
(readers should notice that I have normalised them by dividing by the number of
Cournot or Bertrand players respectively). The bold lines refer to an oligopoly with
two Cournot players and three Bertrand firms, zero marginal costs and a value of
b = 1/2. The intersection of the lines (E) marks the mixed Nash equilibrium in
this case. The thin lines refer to an oligopoly with n = 3 and N − n = 2. I have
also plotted the pure Bertrand and Cournot results into the graph (dotted lines), in
order to compare the mixed oligopoly with those well known results.
The figure illustrates the relationship between the strategic price and quantity ag-
gregates: If prices go up (so price setters play a less aggressive strategy), the Cournot
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players will react by increasing their output. As X is increasing in P, it is a strate-
gic substitute to P. On the other hand, price adjusting companies will reduce their
prices if quantity setters play more aggressively, hence prices of Bertrand players are
strategic complements to the aggregate quantity X.
The analytic solution corresponds to the solution of the equation system (13) and
(14). Note that both response functions are linear in P and X respectively—thus a
unique solution exists.
P∗ =
1
(1− b)z
(
(N − n)(1− b)(2− b+ 2b(N − n)) + α
n∑
i=1
ci + β
N∑
i=n+1
ci
)
(15)
X∗ =
1
(1− b)z
(
n(1− b)(2 + b(2N − 2n− 1))− γ
n∑
i=1
ci + δ
N∑
i=n+1
ci
)
(16)
To simplify the presentation of the analytic results, I have substituted the denomi-
nator (1− b)(4 + b(6N − 4n − 4)) + b2(2N(N − n)−N − 1) by z, and I use greek
letters for the factor terms of (aggregate) costs:
α = b(N − n) + b2(N − n− 1)
β = (1− b)(2 + b(4N − 3n− 3)) + b2((2N − n)(N − n)− (N + 1))
γ = (1− b)(2 + 3b(N − n− 1)) + b2((N − n)2 − (N − n))
δ = bn+ b2(N − n− 2).
As can be seen by direct inspection, α, β, γ, δ and z are all positive for any n < N
with N, n ∈ N and 0 < b < 1. That proposal is most obvious for big N and n. For
small numbers, the reader might go and see for himself by own calculation.
Inserting (15) and (16) into (11) and (12) then results in the equilibrium output and
price of a company j using a quantity strategy and a firm k that adjusts prices.
xj =
(1− b)[4 + 8b(N − n− 1) + b2(2(N − n)− 1)(2(N − n)− 3)]
z(1− b)(2− b+ 2b(N − n))
+

∑n
i=1 ci + (− b3)
∑N
i=n+1 ci − κcj
z(1− b)(2− b+ 2b(N − n)) (17)
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pj − cj = (1 + b(N − n))(1− b)[4 + 8b(N − n− 1) + b
2(2(N − n)− 1)(2(N − n)− 3)]
z(1 + b(N − n− 1)(2− b+ 2b(N − n))
+
(1 + b(N − n))[∑ni=1 ci + (− b3)∑Ni=n+1 ci − κcj]
z(1 + b(N − n− 1)(2− b+ 2b(N − n)) (18)
xk =
(1 + b(N − n− 2))(1− b)[4 + 8b(N − n− 1) + b2(2(N − n)− 1)(2(N − n)− 3)]
z(1− b)(1 + b(N − n− 1))(2− 3b+ 2b(N − n))
+
(1 + b(N − n− 2))[∑ni=1 ci + (− b3)∑Ni=n+1 ci − κck]
z(1− b)(1 + b(N − n− 1))(2− 3b+ 2b(N − n)) (19)
pk − ck = (1− b)[4 + 8b(N − n− 1) + b
2(2(N − n)− 1)(2(N − n)− 3)]
z(2− 3b+ 2b(N − n))
+

∑n
i=1 ci + (− b3)
∑N
i=n+1 ci − κck
z(2− 3b+ 2b(N − n)) (20)
Again, I have replaced some terms, using  and κ as substitutes. Both  and κ are
positive for admissable values of N , n and b:
 = (1− b)[2b+ b2(4N − 4n− 3)] + b3[2(N − n)2 − (N − n)]
κ = (1− b)[4 + b(10N − 8n− 8) + b2(4(2N − n)(N − n)− 8(N − n)− 3(N − 1))]
− b3[N(2(N − n)2 − (N − n))− (N − n)]
General results do not offer any surprises. As can be expected, output and mark up
on marginal costs will decline if more companies enter the market (note the increase
in z). An increase in a firm’s own production cost has the same impact, while rising
costs of competitors lead to an opposite result: own mark-up and output increase
in this case.
3 Strategic Effects of Technology Switch-Over
Using the results of the previous section, we are now able to investigate the strategic
effect of electronic coordination on market performance. To simplify the exposition, I
assume for the further analysis that production does not carry any costs, no matter
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which technology is used (that is, cj = ck = 0). So, any cost effect linked to
different technologies is ignored. In reality, a technology change may alter a firm’s
cost structure; however, it is not my intention to explain technology switch-over by
cost savings.
In a first step, the market position of an old Cournot player is compared with the
position of a company using a new production technology and therefore acting as
a price setting company. The intention is to prove whether it is the price or the
quantity setter to be in a profitable strategic situation—e. g. consider the music
industry: does a firm that sells its music as MP3 download on-line earn more or less
than its “traditional” rival?
The second part of this section analyses the consequences of technology switch-over,
that is, a Cournot player turning into a Bertrand player: is it profitable to introduce
electronic or digital production and distribution technology in the own firm from a
strategic point of view, e. g. in order to supply music on-line? Hereby, the firm has
to consider the effect of the own technology switch-over on the market structure.
After the technology change, there is one less traditional supplier on the market,
but an additional firm using electronic coordination.
3.1 Price and Quantity Strategies by Comparison
Intuitively, in a mixed oligopoly market prices of the Bertrand players are higher
than prices of Cournot players with equal (zero) marginal costs. Figure 2 displays the
residual demand of both players: Notice that the rivals of a Cournot player consist
of one Cournot player less, but one additional Bertrand competitor (compared to
the rivals of a price setter). For this reason, the demand function is more elastic for
the Cournot firm. If this firm plays more aggressively, it can grab demand from that
additional price setting firm—it is not possible to draw off demand from Cournot
firms, since they have fixed their output by definition. As a consequence, marginal
revenue from a price cut is higher for the Cournot players, and they will sell their
outputs at lower prices than their Bertrand rivals.
Proposition 1 Cournot players sell at lower prices than Bertrand players: pj < pk.
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Figure 2: The residual demand of a Cournot player j vis-a`-vis a Bertrand firm k
Proof: The quotient of (20) and (18) shows the relation between the product prices
of two firms with equal marginal costs cj = ck = 0, but different strategic situations:
pk
pj
=
(1 + b(N − n− 1))(2− b+ 2b(N − n))
(1 + b(N − n))(2− 3b+ 2b(N − n)) (21)
Note that this fraction has the form (AB−bB)/(AB−2Ab), with A = 1+b(N−n),
B = 2 − b + 2b(N − n) and b positive. The numerator exceeds the denominator,
since B < 2A. Hence pk > pj.2
However, a comparison of profits leads to a different result.
Proposition 2 Cournot players earn more profit than Bertrand players: pij > pik.
4
4Proposition 1 and 2 hold for any cj = ck = c, that is, for any two firms that equal in marginal
costs.
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Proof: Using equation (21) and the fact that from (17) to (20)
pij =
(1− b)(1 + b(N − n))
(1 + b(N − n− 1)) · x
2
j (22)
and pik =
(1 + b(N − n− 2))
(1− b)(1 + b(N − n− 1)) · (pk − ck)
2, (23)
yields the proportion of the profits:
pik
pij
=
(1 + b(N − n− 2))(2− b+ 2b(N − n))2
(1 + b(N − n))(2− 3b+ 2b(N − n))2 (24)
This fraction has the structure ((A − 2b)B2)/(A(B − 2b)2). As can be seen easily,
the denominator exceeds the numerator if 2Ab−B(2A−B) > 0. This condition is
always fulfilled for positive values of A, B and b, because B < 2A and 2A−B = b.2
Notice that a Bertrand firm earns less profit, but charges a higher price than a
Cournot rival. Therefore its sales are lower. Thus, the analysis of the market
position implies these results:
• In a differentiated oligopoly, comparable companies sell at different prices,
depending on their use of price or quantity strategies. To be more exact, the
quantity adjusting firm sells more, but at a lower price, than its price setting
rival.
• The strategic quantity effect outweighs the price effect. Thus, the price setting
firm is caught in an adverse situation and earns less profit than its quantity
competitor.
3.2 The Impact of Technology Switch-Over
Now consider a firm that decides to introduce a new technology. The results stated
above suggest that this firm suffers a strategic disadvantage in this case. Still, it
has to bear in mind that the switch-over of own technology also has an impact on
total market structure: The number of price adjusting firms increases to N −n+1,
while the quantity of Cournot players on the market drops to n− 1. This has to be
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taken into consideration when evaluating the impact of technology change on the
own market position, market performance and social benefit.
Does a firm charge a higher or a lower price when it introduces new technology?
As the technology switch-over (and therefore the switch-over of the strategy set)
lets the own residual demand uneffected, that firm would not have any incentive to
change its own quantity or prices if its competitors did not change their strategy.
However, its competitors face a new strategic situation. From their point of view,
the number of Cournot rivals on the market has decreased by one, whereas one
additional Bertrand firm competes on the market. Hence, their demand becomes
more elastic and they play more aggressively. As a result, prices of the rivals go
down and the switching firm reacts with reduced prices. From this, it follows:
Proposition 3 If a firm turns into a Bertrand player, it will charge a lower price
than it used to receive as a Cournot player: pNj,n > p
N
k,n−1.
Proof: Note that we have to compare the price of a Bertrand firm to a Cournot
player on a market that consists of one Bertrand player less and an additional
Cournot player instead. Let pNj,n be the equilibrium price of a Cournot player, p
N
k,n
that of a Bertrand firm in an oligopoly market with n Cournot and N −n Bertrand
players. Under the assumption that cj = ck = 0, one receives from (18) and (20)
after simple transformations:
pNj,n − pNk,n−1 =
b3(1− b)[2bN(N − n− 1) +N(2 + b)− 2nb+ 3b− 2]
(1 + b(N − n− 1)) · ψ · ω (25)
where ψ = (1− b)(4 + b(6N − 4n)) + b2(2N(N − n) + (N − 1))
ω = (1− b)(4 + b(6N − 4n− 4)) + b2(2N(N − n)−N − 1)
For N > n ∈ N and 0 < b < 1, the numerator as well as ψ and ω are then positive.
So pNj,n − pNk,n−1 > 0.2
How does a firm’s profit change after the technology switch-over? To see this, first
consider the remaining Cournot players.
Proposition 4 The more Bertrand firms exist, the lower are the profits of the re-
maining Cournot players: piNj,n > pi
N
j,n−1.
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This is coherent with the overall decline in prices, which leads to lower marginal
revenue for any quantity choice.
Proof: From (17) and (22) one receives ∂pij/∂n:
∂pij
∂n
=
b3(1− b)2(2 + 2b(N − n)− 3b)[4N − 8 + b((8N − 4)(N − n− 1) + 6)]
(1 + b(N − n− 1))2 · ω3
+
b5(1− b)(2 + 2b(N − n)− 3b)[4N(N − n)2 − 2(N − n)(2n− 1) +N + 1]
(1 + b(N − n− 1))2 · ω3
(26)
As can be seen easily, this expression is positive for all N > 2 and n < N − 1 ∈ R+.
As the sign of the denominator is positive in the total range of 0 < n < N − 1,
the profit function has to be continous and continously differentiable there. From
the sign of the numerator follows: piNj,n > pi
N
j,n−1 ∀n < N, n > 2, n,N ∈ N.
Comparing profits in the two special cases, one receives that piNj,N > pi
N
j,N−1 and
pi
[2]
j,2 > pi
[2]
j,1. 2
I am now in the position to state the strategic impact of a technology switch-over:
Proposition 5 A Cournot firm turning into a Bertrand firm suffers a strategic
disadvantage.
Proof: This statement follows directly from proposition 2 and proposition 4.
From proposition 4, we know that Cournot firms earn less when the number of
Cournot firms declines. From proposition 2, we know that Bertrand firms earn less
than Cournot firms. If a firm introduces new technology, it will turn from Cournot
to Bertrand competition, and the number of Cournot players on the market will be
reduced by one.2
However, the impact of a strategy change on the other price setting companies is
ambigous, because for close substitutes (b > 2/3), the output of Cournot competitors
declines in this case. Due to the adverse effect of intensified aggressiveness by the
price adjusting firms—it hits the quantity playing rivals more severely—, a reduction
of n may even result in higher profits for Bertrand players, while the Cournot rivals
earn less.
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Do customers benefit from electronic commerce? At least this model framework
gives a positive answer.
Proposition 6 If one Cournot player turns into a Bertrand firm, all firms charge
lower prices.
Proof: From proposition 1, follows directly that pNj,n < p
N
k,n and p
N
j,n−1 < p
N
k,n−1.
From proposition 3, we know that pNk,n−1 < p
N
j,n. Thus we can formulate the
following inequation chain: pNj,n−1 < p
N
k,n−1 < p
N
j,n < p
N
k,n. As can be seen by direct
inspection, pNj,n−1 < p
N
j,n and p
N
k,n−1 < p
N
k,n. 2
The universal price cut, initialised by the technology switch-over, eases the represen-
tative consumer’s budget constraint. Thereby, his real wealth is enlarged. While the
firms that introduce electronic commerce suffer a strategic disadvantage, costumers
benefit from the emergence of new digital production and distribution. Market
efficiency rises as well since price mark-ups on zero marginal costs shrink.
4 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to show that negative strategic impacts of a process
innovation on own profit occur, if in turn the company competes in prices instead of
quantities when using electronic coordination in production and distribution. There
are two main reasons for that: Firstly, the innovation involves a change in market
structure, the number of price setting firms increases while Cournot rivals shrink.
Even in a mixed oligopoly, this leads to fiercer competition. Secondly, turning into
a price setting firm, it suffers a strategical disadvantage compared to its rivals. Yet,
more price competition would increase market efficiency. From that point of view,
one should expect too little incentives for firms to invest in new technologies of
electronic coordination.
However, generalising this statement would overstress my arguments: In a broader
context, one has to regard effects that go in the opposite direction. It has to be taken
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into consideration that new technologies are introduced precisely because costs of
production can be reduced significantly. As a consequence, producers still using
old technique may be driven out of the market. Intensity of competition might
be reduced that way. Another objection states that electronic coordination offers
vast possibilities to collect customer data. This enables companies to judge their
consumers’ preferences more precisely and may help to discriminate prices. A global
view which includes these aspects might be the topic for further research.
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